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Abstract
This paper examines the ethnic and household registration system (hukou) effects on intergenerational social mobility for
men in China. Using national representative surveys covering almost two decades (1996–2014), we assess both absolute
and relative rates of mobility by ethnicity and hukou origin. With regard to absolute mobility, we find that minority men
had significantly lower rates of total and upward mobility than Han men, and those from rural hukou origins faced more
unfavourable chances. With regard to relative mobility, we find men of rural ethnic origins significantly less likely to in-
herit their parental positions. Even with parental and own educational qualifications and party memberships controlled
for, we still find ethnic minority men of rural hukou origins behind others in access to professional-managerial positions.
Overall, our findings suggest that the preferential policies have largely removed the ethnic differences in the urban sector
but ethnic minority men from rural hukou origins are faced with double disadvantages: in addition to the inequality of
opportunity rooted in the institutional divide which they share with the majority group from similar backgrounds, they
face much greater inequalities in conditions, namely, in having poorer socio-economic and cultural resources.
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1. Introduction
The aim of this paper, drawing on national representa-
tive sample surveys in China, is to examine the social in-
equality in intergenerational class mobility in terms of
ethnic and structural relations. We address ethnic and
structural inequalities simultaneously by exploring the
mobility differences between the ethnic minority and
the majority (Han), and for people from urban and rural
origins. The ethnic dimension is easy to understand but
unlike the situation in western countries, ethnicity has
added complexity in China due to the scale, diversity, ge-
ography and political importance of the ethnic minority
groups. The structural differences refer to the inequali-
ties embedded in the household registration (hukou) sys-
temwhich was implemented in the 1950s and which has
limited the upward mobility chances of people from ru-
ral origins for over half a century. Any mobility research
on China would be incomplete without taking into ac-
count the hukou effects. Quite a few studies have been
conducted examining the hukou effects on mobility but
to the best of our knowledge, no research has been con-
ducted on intergenerational social mobility by ethnicity
in China. To this end, this paper seeks to understand the
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ethno-hukou intersection in contemporary China by pro-
viding evidence on both the absolute and the relative
rates of social class mobility.
Social mobility research and ethnic studies are, as Li
and Heath (2016) note, both concerned with the same
underlying issue, that of social equality and social justice.
Social inequality, be it manifested in terms of family back-
ground, ethnicity/race, gender, age, disability, sexuality
or other ascribed characteristics, is economically ineffi-
cient, morally indefensible and politically illegitimate. In
the western capitalist countries, ethnic issues are mainly
concerned with the difficulties faced by immigrants and
their descendants in education, employment and career
advancement, and are thus a matter of inter-ethnic re-
lations and of socio-economic integration. In China, eth-
nicity has, in addition to socio-economic equality, extra
considerations such as political stability, national unity
and border safety as most of the ethnic minorities live in
the western part of the country which tends to be moun-
tainous, under-developed and bordering other countries.
The Chinese government attaches great importance to
ethnic unity and equality and has, especially in the last
few decades, instigated numerous preferential policies
to try to help the minorities in their socio-economic de-
velopment. Quite a few studies have been made to eval-
uate the effects of such policies but owing to the lack of
appropriate data on parental class position, researchers
have thus far been unable to assess whether ethnic mi-
norities have similarmobility chances to those by thema-
jority, the extent of difference, and the possible reasons
that may underlie such differences. The present analy-
sis wishes to provide evidence to these questions for the
first time.
This paper is structured as follows. In the next sec-
tion, we give a brief review of the socio-economic-demo-
graphic profile of China’s ethnic minorities, the prefer-
ential policies adopted by the Chinese Government to-
wards the minorities to improve their life chances, and
the research findings about the education, employment
and income situations of the ethnic groups. A brief dis-
cussion will also be made of the main findings from the
social mobility research perspective for the urban and
the rural populations in China. After that, we explain the
data and methods to be used in the paper, followed by
presentation of our findings on both the absolute and
the relativemobility rates along ethnic and hukou dimen-
sions. In the final section, we summarize our findings
with some discussion.
2. Ethnic Minorities in China
China is a vast country with a very large population. It is
also a multi-ethnic and multicultural country. There are
currently 55 officially-designated ethnic minority groups
in addition to the Han majority. According to the 2010
Census of the Population of the People’s Republic of
China (PRC), 114 million people were of ethnic minority
heritages, accounting for 8.49% of the overall population
(National Bureau of Statistics of the People’s Republic of
China, 2011).
Whilst ethnicminorities take up a relatively small pro-
portion in the overall population in China, they occupy a
strategically important position as they live in areas com-
prising around two thirds of the nation’s territory. The
Chinese Communist Party (CCP) enacted pro-ethnic poli-
cies in its controlled areas even during the war years,
promising equal rights for all ethnic minorities (Sautman,
1999). After the PRC was founded in 1949, the central
government made numerous efforts to protect minor-
ity interests and promote their socio-economic develop-
ment such as by giving them official legal status, creating
written language for some of the groups, guaranteeing
equal rights in the 1982 Constitution, promoting equal
opportunities in the 1984 Lawof Regional Autonomy and
many subsequent laws and regulations at the central and
provincial levels (Gladney, 1996; Lin, 1997).
Owing to the low population density and the vast
areas of territory the ethnic minorities populate, the
central government gave areas with relatively high eth-
nic concentrations a special political and administrative
status called ‘ethnic autonomous regions’. Five such au-
tonomous regionswere created at the provincial level (In-
ner Mongolia, Guangxi, Tibet, Ningxia, and Xinjiang), 30
autonomous areas at the prefectural level and 120 au-
tonomous administrative units at the county level (Na-
tional Bureau of Statistics of the People’s Republic of
China, 2015). Being an autonomous region does not nec-
essarily mean that ethnic minorities comprise the over-
whelming majority of the residents in the area. As a mat-
ter of fact, they only consist of 45% of the population in
the five regions. But the overall socio-economic levels in
the areas are below those in the rest of the country, espe-
cially the big cities and the coastal areas which have wit-
nessed rapid development since the reform programme
was launched in 1978.
China has a tradition of treating all ethnic groups as
members of a big family in the nationhood building. In
fact, in the Chinese language, the word ‘country’ (guo
jia) literally means ‘nation family’. To ensure equal rights
amongst the familymembers (the different ethnic groups
in this case), the central government and the CCP have
adopted many measures to enhance the political, social
and economic wellbeing of the ethnic minority groups.
Several social movements were launched in the 1950s
and 1960s to combat Han chauvinism in minority areas,
to show full respect to the cultural traditions of the ethnic
minority groups, to avoid condescendence in attitudes,
behaviours and practices when working with people of
ethnic minority heritages, and to fight against discrimi-
nation of one kind or another, especially in recruitment
and promotion (Chao, 1994; McMillen, 1979, p. 114). At
the same time, tens of thousands of educated youths and
technical personnel were sent from the majority popu-
lation to the autonomous areas to help with the socio-
economic development, and to strengthen the national
security of the border areas (Attané & Courbage, 2000).
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The ethnic minorities, like people in the rest of the
country, suffered during the chaotic period of the Cul-
tural Revolution (1966–1976), with minority cultural cus-
toms labelled as primitive, minority cadres exposed to
ridicule, and pro-ethnic policies regarded as unneces-
sary (Dreyer, 1968; He, 2005, p. 69; Lin, 1997). Since the
early 1980s, a wide range of policy measures have been
adopted tomitigate the adverse influence of the Cultural
Revolution and to support the socio-economic develop-
ment of minorities including, most importantly, the 1982
State Constitution of China in which equal rights were en-
shrined in law for all ethnicities in the country. The pre-
vious autonomous administration system was reinstated
at the provincial and lower levels, and numerous prefer-
ential policies were enacted and implemented from the
central to the local governments to help the minorities,
including exemptions from the one-child family-planning
policy, lower marks for university admissions, economic
assistance and tax reduction, andmore favourable oppor-
tunities for recruitment and promotion. The overall aim
of the policies was not only for theminorities to have bet-
ter opportunities, but also to achieve the ultimate aim of
equal outcomes among all ethnic groups (Chen, 1991).
As compared with ‘affirmative action’ or ‘positive
discrimination’ programmes in some other countries,
China’s preferential policies are, as Sautman notes,
‘broader (encompassing a wider array), deeper (affect-
ing almost all minority people) andmore variegated (due
to decentralization)’ (1998, p. 86). Perhaps the most no-
table example of such policies pertains to the minorities’
exemption from the strict regulations on family planning.
The one-child policy was implemented nationwide in the
1980s, but most of the minority groups were allowed to
have two children in the urban areas and three or four in
the rural areas (Attané & Courbage, 2000; Bulte, Heerink,
& Zhang, 2011; Sautman, 1999). Although the policy var-
ied to some extent over time and across regions, the prin-
ciple of showing respect to minority cultures by allowing
them to have more children remained unchanged. Yet,
as we are going to see, this preferential treatment in the
form of ‘greater opportunities’ may have yielded an un-
intended consequence, in the sense of aggravating the
already existing inequality of condition and creating ad-
ditional barriers for mobility. We shall come to this later
when we discuss the findings. Here we focus on policies
that might have had direct and positive impacts on the
minorities’ life chances, including those on education,
employment, and economic support.
With regard to education, China’s Compulsory Educa-
tion Law (1992) covers all children for nine years, from
primary to lower secondary schools. Yet full coverage
was not achieved in the remote areas, most of which
were in minority autonomous regions. Many people in
these areas were in dire poverty and could not even af-
ford the basic teaching materials. In order to improve
the coverage and ensure the basic standard of education
in the minority areas, the central government allocated
special resources called the Ethnic Minorities Education
Aid Special Fund. In 1994, the state raised the funding to
one billion Chinese Yuan per year, a fivefold increase as
comparedwith the previous years.With the assistance of
the fund, hundreds of boarding schools were built in the
remote areas. Students were exempted from fees for tu-
ition andbooks and, inmany cases,were guaranteed free
food, clothing, lodging, and supplementary studymateri-
als (Sautman, 1998, p. 91). Ethnic autonomous regions
were also encouraged to develop their own curriculum
and use their own language in the local schools. These
programmes catered for the special needs on language,
culture and historical traditions of the local ethnic com-
munities, and the expenses in teacher training, curricu-
lum designing and extra printing were partly funded by
the government budget (Postiglione, 2009, p. 504). Yet
the special treatment for teaching ethnic languages and
cultures also added to the students’ difficulty in learning,
making them proficient in neither the local nor the na-
tional language and lowering their prospects for advanc-
ing into higher levels of education.
As for higher education, ethnic minority students en-
joy a range of preferential policies. For university admis-
sion, ethnic students were given extra points on the ba-
sis of their original marks in the national entrance exam-
ination or were offered a lower threshold for admission.
For example, Sautman (1998) reported that in Xinjiang
in 1987, the Han (majority) students needed an average
score of 470 points in science and 445 points in liberal
arts for access to key universities, while the minorities
only needed an average score of 313 and 269 points re-
spectively. In addition, the government has established
more than 20 universities for ethnicminorities, mostly lo-
cated within the minority areas, so that the minority stu-
dents could have access to higher education near their
hometown (Huang, 2000). These universities mainly en-
rol students fromminority backgrounds and offer special
subjects based on the needs of different ethnic regions.
In order to enhance the education quality of minority
students, the state has initiated a programme for top
national universities to form partnerships with those in
minority autonomous regions for cooperation and assis-
tance, such as teacher training, facility donation, library
resource sharing, and various other forms of exchange
(Yang & Wu, 2009).
The preferential treatment does not stop at educa-
tion. Ethnic minorities in China also enjoy favourable
treatment in recruitment and promotion, especially in
the autonomous regions. The 1993 Regulations on Work
with the Urban National Minorities called on enterprises
to recruit moreminority workers in return for lower taxes
or tax breaks. As in the case of university admission,
when examinations were required for job seekers, minor-
ity applicants would have bonus points. For instance, in
the employment examination for an oil and chemical fac-
tory inUrumqi, the capital city of Xinjiang autonomous re-
gion, applicants from theHanmajority needed250points
whereas the minimum for minorities was 120. In some
cases, theminority status is necessary as employers need
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to meet the job quotas to reflect the ethnic composition
of the population in the local area (Sautman, 1998).
The preferential policies give even greater advan-
tages to ethnic minorities for access to cadre positions
or promotions within government agencies. According
to the 1982 State Constitution of China, the head of eth-
nic autonomous regions must be a member of the eth-
nic group that comprises the majority of the population
in that particular location, and the preference was then
extended to such an extent as to prioritiseminority candi-
dates in the recruitment of lower-level government per-
sonnel as well (Gustafsson & Li, 2003). As a result, many
places have seen an upsurge of hiring and promoting mi-
nority cadres since the 1980s. Of particular note in this
context is the fact that China has a dual leadership sys-
tem, consisting of CCP leaders and administrative offi-
cials at all levels of government agencies and state-run
enterprises. The party leaders in the minority areas do
not have to be members from the ethnic minorities and
thus the minorities are more represented in the adminis-
trative than in the party organisations.
The Chinese government has not only provided finan-
cial and other kinds of help to individuals of ethnicminor-
ity heritages in education and employment but also en-
acted favourable economic policies for the autonomous
regions where minority ethnics tend to reside. In the
more recent times, the government has initiated two
grand projects, The Development of the Western Region
(2000) and The Silk Road Economic Belt (2013), in which
all the five autonomous regions were included as key
areas for national and international investment. In ad-
dition, various preferential policies were introduced to
support economic growth inminority autonomous areas.
As instigated in the 1982 Constitution, the minority au-
tonomous areas are allowed lower tax rates and greater
fiscal controls over their local revenues (Zang & Li, 2001).
At the meso level, programmes such as government-
subsidized microcredit have also been set in motion pri-
oritising poor households in minority areas, and direct
subsidies and tax breaks have been granted to these ar-
eas and to businesses run by minorities. Given the vast
array of economic and other favours enjoyed by ethnic
minorities, having an ethnic minority status is, or is per-
ceived as being, advantageous, which can be seen from
the fact thatmillions of people changed their ethnic iden-
tity from Han to minority status in the 1980s and the
1990s to benefit from the preferential policies conferred
upon the minorities (Sautman, 1999, p. 286), and those
of mixed ethnic backgrounds have also been found to
prefer a minority identity, which have contributed to the
increase in the proportion of theminorities in the overall
population (Hoddie, 1998). A study using a more recent
census data arrived at a similar conclusion, namely, that
children from inter-ethnic families are more inclined to
be registered as minority ethnic rather than as majority
Han (Guo & Li, 2008).
Given the breadth and depth of preferential policies
implemented in China in the last few decades, onemight
ask whether ethnic minorities are still disadvantaged or
whether they have caught up with or even surpassed
the majority group in socio-economic life. Existing stud-
ies have explored this question from different perspec-
tives and we here give a brief summary of the effects in
education, income, and occupational attainment.
With regard to educational attainment, studies have
shown that, after decades of government assistance, eth-
nic differences in primary schooling have been largely re-
moved, but disparities remain at the transition to lower
and higher secondary schools (Hannum, 2002; Hong,
2010). As for college education, although the number of
minority students has been increasing rapidly, the per-
centage is still lower than expected. The ethnic minori-
ties accounted for 8.41% and 9.44% of the national pop-
ulations in 2000 and 2005 respectively,1 but only 5.71%
and 6.10% of the university students came from minor-
ity backgrounds in the two years (Zhu, 2010). Moreover,
one-fourth of these students were enrolled in ethnic
minority colleges, which means the percentages of stu-
dents studying at universities outside the autonomous
regions were even lower (Qin, 2004).
Why are ethnic minorities underrepresented in
higher levels of education? Scholars believe that regional
economic differentiations and household socioeconomic
disparities were the most important factors. The ethnic
disadvantages tended to increase after themarket transi-
tion as the local economic conditions have been playing
an increasingly important role in local school resources
and educational quality (Hannum, 2002). A lower level of
proficiency in Mandarin has also been reported as a cru-
cial contributing factor to the ethnic minority children’s
poorer school performance. Minority students with a
family background usingMandarin were around twice as
likely to be enrolled in high school as those who used
minority languages at home (Hong, 2010). Bilingual ed-
ucation using Mandarin plus a minority language was an
attempt to preserve minority cultures, but it added bur-
dens tominority students from poor homes whowere al-
ready struggling with their studies (Lin, 1997), incurring
dissatisfaction among ethnic parents (Ma, 2007). On the
other hand, the preferential policies enjoyed by the mi-
nority students also caused dissatisfaction from among
the majority students and their parents who lived along-
side the minorities in the minority regions (Ma, 2008).
Turning to income, findings are mixed. Some stud-
ies have shown that minorities are economically worse
off than are the Han majority. For example, Gao and
Teng (2006) showed that the ethnic regions in north-
west China had an underdeveloped industrial economy
1 The data on the proportions of ethnicminorities in China for 2000 and 2010 are from the Censuses of the Population in the two years, but those for 2005
are from the 1% population sampling survey. See http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjsj/tjgb/rkpcgb/qgrkpcgb/200603/t20060316_30326.html. Thus while all
three proportions (8.41%, 9.44%, and 8.49% for 2000, 2005 and 2010) are official figures on ethnic compositions, that for 2005 may not be as accurate
as the other two.
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which accounted for the ethnic poverty in those regions.
Gustafsson and Sai (2009) found that the minorities had
a poverty risk almost twice as high as that for the ma-
jority in rural China, but they attributed the difference
to location. When location and household characteris-
tics are both taken into account, they conclude, ethnic-
ity does not ‘have much of an independent effect on
poverty status’ and the most promising policies for nar-
rowing the inter-ethnic poverty gaps should, according to
the authors, be those ‘promoting growth in low-income
villages (that are concentrated to western China) irre-
spective of the ethnicity of the inhabitant’ (Gustafsson
& Sai, 2009, p. 604; see also Gustafsson & Li, 2003). In
other words, the authors believe that, in fighting against
poverty-related inequality, it is location, rather than eth-
nicity, that matters.
Yet ethnicity is found to matter in terms of occupa-
tional attainment. Hannum and Xie (1998) examined oc-
cupational differences between the Han majority and
the ethnic minorities in Xinjiang. Using census data from
1982 and 1990, they found a rising occupational dissimi-
larity between Han and the minorities. For example, the
overall percentage of the labour force in agricultural oc-
cupations declined from 58.9% to 49.6% between the
two-time points, but the percentage for theminorities in-
creased from69.4% to 76.7%. The rising concentration of
the minorities in agricultural work was accompanied by
a falling representation in almost all other occupational
categories, and educational inequality was held as a key
factor for the increasing dissimilarity, especially in the
attainment of high-status occupations. In a similar vein,
Sautman (1999) found that whilst ethnic minorities had
an overrepresentation of cadres as benefiting from the
preferential policies in cadre appointment, they were un-
derrepresented among technical and professional occu-
pations. As both studies were based on Xinjiang, it is not
possible to knowwhether the findings would be general-
izable to the ethnic occupational difference in the over-
all population.
These and other studieswhichwehave not been able
to include here due to space limit of the paper havemuch
enhanced our understanding of the ethnic minority dis-
advantages in the different domains of socio-economic
life in China. Yet, there is one common feature, or rather
a common limitation, in all such analyses, namely, the
lack of information on parental social position which has
prevented researchers from exploring the family origin
effects on the ethnic minorities’ mobility chances. In
other words, much work has been conducted compar-
ing the inequalities of opportunity but little work has
been carried out that examines the inequalities of con-
dition and the consequences of such inequalities on life
chances between the minority and the majority groups.
With regard to studies that do explore the effects of
family class, another deficiency is shown. Parallel towhat
Li and Heath (2016) observed for Britain, ethnic and mo-
bility research scholars in China have also been travel-
ling on separate tracks with the former ignoring family
class and the latter ignoring ethnic effects. China’s sit-
uation is more complicated than that in Britain though,
due to additional layers of stratification. The most signif-
icant of such layers is that of the household registration
(hukou) system. As earlier noted, this system was imple-
mented in 1955 requiring all new-born babies to be regis-
tered following mother’s status, forcing the great major-
ity of the Chinese people at that time and in most of the
subsequent periods to have rural hukou, unable to enjoy
the benefits provided by the government to urbanites
in education, employment, housing, medical insurance
and a host of other areas. For decades, the hukou system
has served as themost important institutional divide pre-
venting rural citizens fromupwardmobility. Given this, al-
most all important mobility analyses in China have taken
hukou into consideration.
Within the mobility domain, one of the most impor-
tant studies is that by Wu and Treiman (2007). Using a
national representative sample called Life History and So-
cial Change (conducted in 1996), the authors conducted
a thorough analysis of intergenerational social mobility
for men in China and found a large-scale downward mo-
bility into agriculture, a feature not elsewhere found in
international mobility research. Yet this apparently sur-
prising finding is exactly what would be expected from
the hukou system: rural sons cannot follow in their fa-
thers’ footsteps if the fathers were professionals or man-
agers working in the countryside such as teachers, doc-
tors or cadres but their mothers were agricultural work-
ers (peasants). Only a small proportion, ‘the best and
the brightest’, of those from rural origins could gain en-
try tickets to urban life, mainly by gaining admission to
university. On the other hand, given the huge size of
China’s countryside, even a small proportion from the
rural backgrounds who managed to achieve hukou tran-
sition could make a big presence in the cities and, what
is more, the exceptionally gifted, highly educated, new
urbanites tend to take up elite positions. The hukou sys-
tem had a hugely negative effect on rural people’s mobil-
ity chances, which is also reported by Chen (2013) using
the 2005 and 2006 China General Social Survey (CGSS).
More recently, Li, Zhang and Kong (2015) usedmore data
from the CGSS (2005, 2006, 2008, 2010) for China, and
the General Household Survey (2005), the British House-
hold Panel Survey (2006) and the UK Household Longitu-
dinal Survey (2010) for Britain to compare the mobility
profiles in the two countries. They found that social in-
equality in China was much greater than that in Britain,
especially for Chinese women. This, the authors showed,
was chiefly due to the hukou system. Within each hukou
sector, social inequality in China was little different from
that in Britain.
Yet, in spite of the advances in mobility research in
China, none of the available studies have looked at the
ethnic differences in mobility chances. Thus, sadly, eth-
nic research has failed to look at the family origin ef-
fects just as mobility research has neglected the ethnic
dimension in social stratification. Given this, it is imper-
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ative to know whether social reproduction mechanisms
operate in a similar way among the ethnic minorities to
that among the majority in China, or whether the ethnic
minorities face additional barriers over and above those
caused by class origin and hukou status.
3. Data and Variables
In the present study, we use the Life History and Social
Change (LHSC, 1996), China General Social Survey (CGSS,
2005, 2006, 2008, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013) and China
Labour-force Dynamics Survey (CLDS, 2014). Although
conducted by different institutions, all three survey se-
ries employed multistage probability sampling methods
to draw national representative samples for mainland
China. While there are some differences in geograph-
ical coverage between individual surveys, overall, all
31 provinces, autonomous regions and municipalities in
mainland China are covered in the surveys.2 The CGSS
series also includes data for 2003 but that survey cov-
ers urban residents only and is therefore not used in the
present analysis.
In this study, we use ‘ethnicminority’ as an overall cat-
egory without further differentiating between the 55 mi-
nority groups. This by no means implies that they are ho-
mogenous. The Korean minority, for instance, have been
found to have the best educational attainment in China
(Lee, 1986). Thus, different ethnic groups do have con-
siderable demographic, socioeconomic, and cultural dif-
ferences including fertility, mortality, education, occupa-
tion, and use ofMandarin (Ma, 2008, 2010; Poston& Shu,
1987; Yusuf & Byrnes, 1994). We group them together
based on two considerations: first, all ethnic minorities
enjoy similar preferential policies despite their specific
historical and cultural characteristics, which sets them
apart from the Han majority. Secondly, as the minorities
account for less than 10% in the population, further dif-
ferentiationswould lead to very small sample sizes for the
groupings, making it untenable in statistical analysis.
With regard to father’s and respondent’s class, we
use the EGP class schema (Erikson, Goldthorpe, & Por-
tocarero, 1979), which is the most widely used class
schema for intergenerational social mobility research
adopted by practitioners in many countries including
China (Chen, 2013; Li et al., 2015; Hannum & Xie, 1998;
Wu & Treiman, 2007). We acknowledge that other mark-
ers of institutional division such as workplace unit (dan-
wei), hukou status or political power might add com-
plexity to the social stratification of the Chinese society,
and mobility students on China may apply class-, status-
or power- based schemas. In order to take account of
the unique characteristics of the Chinese society and to
make the results comparable to mobility findings from
other countries, we adopt the EGP schema. In our further
analysis, we also, where appropriate, control for other at-
tributes relevant to mobility such as age, education and
CCP membership. We take the hukou-ethnicity combina-
tion in much of our analysis as a key explanatory vari-
able on people’s mobility trajectory alongside father’s
class. The EGP class schema is based on employment
status and occupational position (current or last main
job). All information with regard to respondent’s and fa-
ther’s employment status and occupational position was
collected in the surveys and was coded in a consistent
way into own and parental class variables. In the present
study, we differentiate, for fathers and respondents alike,
five classes: (1) professional and managerial salariat,
(2) routine non-manual (clerical), (3) self-employed (own-
account), (4) routine manual, and (5) agricultural work-
ers (also called ‘peasant’ in China). For hukou status, we
use the respondent’s origin hukou, namely, the status in
the adolescent years (around age 14–18).We confine our
analysis tomen aged 16 to 65 in this analysis, and exclude
those who have never worked such as students, which
gives us a sample size of 35,147 for analysis. Gender and
workplace affiliation (danwei) are also very important di-
mensions of social stratification in China (Li et al., 2015;
Lin & Bian, 1991) but space limitations do not allow us to
explore these in this paper.
4. Analysis
Following standard approaches in the literature we ad-
dress both absolute and relative rates of mobility by eth-
nicity and hukou status. To assess absolutemobility rates,
we start with the class distributions by the various ethno-
hukou groups, supplemented by an analysis of gross and
net amounts of mobility. The former is measured by us-
ing the dissimilarity index (DI) and the latter by using
Lieberson’s (1975) net difference index (NDI). The DI indi-
cates the percentages of cases thatwould have to be real-
located to make the two distributions identical and thus
measures the overall difference between any two distri-
butions. As the DI is insensitive to the local concentra-
tions in or the direction of differences between, father’s
and son’s classes, we use the NDI to show the net class
decline or advancement of the son’s relative to the fa-
ther’s class.3 Proceeding from this, we analyse the total,
2 The data files, including technical reports, for LHSC, CGSS and CLDS are available at https://dataverse.harvard.edu/dataset.xhtml?persistentId=hdl:1902.
1/M889V1, http://www.cnsda.org/, and http://css.sysu.edu.cn/Data respectively. Qinghai and Ningxia were not covered prior to 2010 and Xizang (Ti-
bet) was only covered in 2010. Nevertheless, this is the best social survey series available covering mainland China. The response rates in the CGSS are
62.1%, 60.4%, 59.7%, 74.3%, 72.6%, 71.5% and 72.2% for 2005, 2006, 2008, 2010, 2011, 2012 and 2013 respectively. The CLDS is a panel study, with
the wave 2 (2014) response rate being 75.7% of the wave 1 (2012). See http://css.sysu.edu.cn/Data/List?type=%e4%b8%ad%e5%9b%bd%e5%8a%b3
%e5%8a%a8%e5%8a%9b%e5%8a%a8%e6%80%81%e8%b0%83%e6%9f%a5
3 The NDI is defined as NDxy = pr(X > Y) − pr(Y > X) and further defined as
n
∑
i=2
χi
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
n=i−1
∑
j=1
γj
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠ −
n
∑
i=2
γi
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
n=i−1
∑
j=1
χj
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠where, in our case, X indicates father’s class
and Y that of the respondent. It is noted here that we reversed the class order in calculating the NDI with 1 referring to agricultural workers and 5 to
the salariat.
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upward and downward mobility rates and examine each
by ethno-hukou differentiations. To address relative mo-
bility, we use loglinear and log-multiplicative layer effect
(also called uniform difference, UNIDIFF) models. These
are then supplemented with logit models on son’s ac-
cess to the professional-managerial salariat controlling
for ethno-hukou status, father’s class, and a range of
socio-demographic attributes.
4.1. Overall Distributions and Absolute Mobility
We begin with the overall class distributions of fathers
and sons, distinguishing the Han majority and the eth-
nic minorities and, for each, within the urban and the ru-
ral sectors. The data are shown in Table 1 where we also
show theDI and theNDI. Looking first at the urban sector,
we can see that there is not much difference between
the Hanmajority and the ethnic minorities in terms of fa-
ther’s or son’s class distributions. Minority fathers have,
if anything, a somewhat higher percentage in salariat po-
sitions (27.3%) than Han fathers (25.2%). Minority sons
are less likely to find themselves in salariat or clerical, and
more likely to find themselves in own-account, positions
relative to their majority peers. When we look at the ru-
ral sector, we see a clear manifestation of ethnic divide.
As expected, the overwhelming majority of fathers from
both groups were agricultural workers, 80% for Han and
84% for minority fathers, and there is little difference in
the distributions to the other class categories. Yet, this
overall similarity in fathers’ distributions is not shown
for sons. Sons from the Han majority group were clearly
more likely to occupy higher social positions, from the
salariat to the manual working class and are therefore
much less likely to find themselves in agricultural posi-
tions (44.6%) as compared with minority men (64.8%).
The DI and the NDI also show greater gross mobility and
net class advancement byHan than byminoritymen, and
that in both urban and rural sectors.
The data in Table 1 thus show that men from eth-
nic minority backgrounds were disadvantaged. This, of
course, is an overall profile, without taking into account
the effects of father’s class on son’s class. In Table 2,
we show the class distribution of sons by father’s class.
For simplicity, we do it by ethnicity but in the ‘summary
statistics’, we also report findings from further analyses
by hukou status and by the ethno-hukou combination.
The ethnic differences are clearly shown in the two
panels. For those fromsalariat families,we see that 38.2%
of Han but only 28.7% of minority sons were able to get
salariat positions and the risks in downwardmobility into
agriculture was three times as high: 34.5% versus 10.5%,
or a difference of 24 percentage points. The difference in
intergenerational stability in agricultural jobs is at a simi-
lar level: 68.5% for minority sons and 49.3% for Han sons.
And comparing the figures under columns 1 and 5, we
can see that themajority (Han) sons from each class back-
grounds were more likely to find themselves in salariat,
and less likely to find themselves in agricultural, jobs.
Thedata in the twopanels of Table 2 are colour-coded
and presented in row percentages. Had we conducted
the analysis in cell percentages, we could have easily ob-
tained the total immobility and mobility rates, with the
latter further differentiated into upward and downward
mobility. The details are shown in the lower part of the
table called ‘summary statistics’ where, in addition to eth-
nic rates, we also present the rates by hukou and, further-
more, by ethno-hukou combinations. Also shown are re-
sults of statistical tests with Han, Urban, and Han urban
as reference groups in the three domain respectively.
At the overall level, over half (53.5%) of the Chinese
men were in different class positions to their fathers,
with 41.8% having better jobs than their fathers and only
11.7% faring worse. Yet the ethnic differences were self-
evident, with theminoritymen having significantly lower
rates in both total and upward mobility rates than their
majority peers. The hukou differences were less clear-
cut, though.Men of rural origins had lower total mobility
rates than their urban peers but their upward mobility
rates were actually significantly higher, and downward
mobility rates significantly lower, than those of their ur-
Table 1. Fathers’ (F) and Respondents’ (R) class distribution by ethnicity and hukou status.
Urban Rural
Han Minority Han Minority
F R F R F R F R
1 Salariat 25.2 31.2 27.3 26.8 6.3 12.5 6.5 8.2
2 Clerical 14.2 17.3 15.1 11.4 3.1 5.9 2.2 3.4
3 Own account 4.8 9.9 8.3 17.8 1.9 12.2 1.5 8.1
4 Routine manual 44.0 39.7 36.6 39.7 8.7 24.8 5.6 15.5
5 Agricultural 11.9 1.8 12.6 4.2 80.0 44.6 84.1 64.8
Dissimilarity index 14.1 12.1 37.8 22.7
Net difference index 15.7 4.6 36.8 21.6
N 7,995 463 23,225 2,375
Source: The Life History and Social Change survey (LHSC, 1996), China General Social Survey (CGSS, 2005, 2006, 2008, 2010, 2011, 2012,
2013) and China Labour-force Dynamics Survey (CLDS, 2014).
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ban peers. This is most likely due to the occupational up-
grading witnessed in the last thirty years, with 260 mil-
lion migrant workers moving to cities to find jobs not all
of which were routine manual in nature. Further analy-
sis shows that of those from rural origins and currently
still holding rural hukou status but not engaged in agri-
cultural work, 13% were doing professional or manage-
rial work, and 9% were doing clerical work. The rural sec-
tor has been held at a much lower place since the 1950s
and it is thus easier for rural residents to move up and
more difficult for them to move further down relative
to the urbanites. And looking at the data on the ethno-
hukou combination, we findwhatwe have suspected:mi-
nority men of rural origins have benefited least from the
socio-economic development of the country—they have
significantly lower rates in both total and upward mobil-
ity than do the urban majority peers.4
4.2. Relative Social Mobility
We now turn to a different way of looking at class re-
production, namely, relative mobility. Our research ques-
tions can be expressed as follows: dowe find aweaker as-
sociation between class origins and destinations among
theminority than among themajority group? Dowe find
a ’perverse openness’ where minority status tends to
’trump’ class so thatminoritymen are held back irrespec-
tive of their fathers’ class situation?
Relative mobility (often termed ‘fluidity’ or ‘open-
ness’) refers to the competition between people fromdif-
ferent origins in obtaining advantaged and avoiding dis-
advantaged destinations, and is expressed in odds ratios.
The closer the odds ratio is to 1, the weaker the class re-
production (and the greater the level of social fluidity or
openness). Our interest, then, is whether the odds ratios
for the minority group are closer to unity than they are
for the majority group. Standard techniques for testing
the relationships are to fit three models: the conditional
independence model which serves as the baseline; the
common social fluidity model (CmSF), which allows for
an association between origin and destination but not
the three-way interactions; and the log-multiplicative
layer effect (also called uniform difference, or UNIDIFF)
model which provides an assessment of the extent to
which the minority group differs from the majority in
themagnitude of the origin/destination odds ratios. This
thirdmodel provides us with a general test of differences
in fluidity, testing whether there is a uniform pattern for
the odds ratios to be closer to (or further away from) 1
in a particular layer of the table. To save space, we do
not provide the statistical formulae of the three mod-
els (interested readers could see Li & Heath, 2016). For
the same reason and as the model fit statistics are quite
abstract, we are not going to show the statistic details
here (results available on request). Basically, none of the
three models fit the data by ethnicity, hukou, and ethno-
hukou combination to an acceptable degree but the UNI-
DIFF models do provide a significant improvement in fit
over the CmSFmodels. Yet, it is of interest to present the
UNIDIFF parameters for the ethno-hukou combination
(Figure 1), which shows that the association between fa-
ther’s and son’s class positions is significantly weaker for
the minority men of rural origins than for the majority of
urban origins.
The UNIDIFF model is good at capturing the magni-
tude of difference in the origins-destinations association
between one layer and another, but it is not good at pin-
pointing the aspect in which the odds ratios defining the
origins-destinations association is particularly strong or
weak. As Li and Devine (2011) and Li and Heath (2016)
show in the British context, the relative mobility can be
much more salient in some aspects of the class competi-
tion than in others. To see thismore clearly in the Chinese
context, we show the symmetrical odds ratios.
4 As we pooled the data from 1996 to 2014, the question arises as to whether there are significant changes in the net association between father’s
and son’s classes over the years covered. Our analysis shows, quite reassuringly (see Footnote Figure 1 below), that whilst some fluctuations manifest
themselves in the year-by-year pattern, the changes are not of a clearly directional order or to a significant extent. It is also noted here that as the LHSC
and the CGSS are individual-level samples and the CLDS is a household-level survey, we randomly selected one adult respondent from each household
in the CLDS.
Footnote Figure 1. UNIDIFF parameter estimates and confidence intervals for survey years.
Social Inclusion, 2017, Volume 5, Issue 1, Pages 5–19 12
Table 2. Class distribution by class of origin (percentage by row).
Class of destination
Class of origin 1 2 3 4 5
Panel 1: Han
1 Salariat 38.2 13.4 11.1 26.7 10.5
2 Clerical 29.0 19.7 12.1 30.6 08.6
3 Own account 26.7 12.1 25.5 28.6 07.1
4 Routine manual 21.4 14.2 11.2 46.2 06.9
5 Agricultural 10.5 05.1 11.1 23.8 49.3
Panel 2: Minority
1 Salariat 28.7 5.5 14.2 17.0 34.5
2 Clerical 23.1 10.8 12.8 33.5 19.7
3 Own account 13.8 11.4 39.9 27.7 7.3
4 Routine manual 15.9 12.3 11.8 47.2 12.7
5 Agricultural 06.9 02.8 07.4 14.5 68.5
Immobility Downward mobility Upward mobility
Summary statistics
Total Upward Downward
All 53.5 41.8 11.7
By ethnicity
Han (ref) 54.7 43.0 11.7
Minority 40.4*** 28.9*** 11.5
By hukou
Urban (ref) 61.9 39.8 22.1
Rural 55.1*** 42.6*** 08.5***
By ethno-hukou
Han urban (ref) 62.0 40.2 21.9
Han rural 52.6*** 44.2*** 08.4***
Minority urban 59.2 33.1* 26.0
Minority rural 37.4*** 28.4*** 09.1***
Note: Significance tests are conducted on the summary statistics. * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001. Minority rural men have
significantly lower levels of total and upward mobility than Han rural men at the 0.001 level in both respects.
Figure 1. UNIDIFF parameter estimates and confidence intervals.
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The data in Table 3 show the relative social ad-
vantages and disadvantages associated with different
classes and along the ethnicity, hukou and ethno-hukou
dimensions. Take the top left-hand cell of the table for
example. The figure (1.93) means that for men from the
majority group (Han), they are nearly twice as likely to
find themselves in salariat rather than clerical positions
if they are from salariat families as compared with men
from clerical families in the same kind of competition
(for salariat rather than clerical jobs). The figure below
it (2.45) refers to the odds ratio for the ethnic minority
men. The minority figure is slightly higher than that for
the majority but the difference is not significant.
Now if we turn our gaze to the top-right cell, we see
16.99 and 8.26 as odds ratios for the competitions be-
tween Classes 1 and 5 for the majority and the minority
men respectively. Thus, among theHan, as comparedwith
a peasant’s son, a salariat’s son is 17 times as likely to find
himself in a professional or a managerial position rather
than as an agricultural worker. Compared with the major-
ity, the minority is less unequal, with the odds ratio being
half the magnitude, and the differences between the two
sets of odds ratios are significant at the 0.001 level. The
lesser inequality as shownhere implies amuch greater dis-
advantage faced by the ethnicminorities in being less able
to inherit their father’s superior class positions.
Table 3. Symmetrical odds ratios for mobility tables by ethnicity, hukou and ethno-hukou combination.
Class
Class 2 3 4 5
Panel 1: by ethnicity
1 Salariat 1.93 3.28 3.09 16.99
2.45 5.77 4.99 18.26***
2 Clerical 3.43 2.08 21.87
2.95 1.24 13.55
3 Own account 3.68 15.87
5.73 −a
4 Routine manual 13.95
17.60
Panel 2: by hukou
1 Salariat 1.79 5.15 2.97 18.33
2.11 2.22** 3.41 16.40***
2 Clerical 3.81 1.83 42.80
2.28 2.36 17.56**
3 Own account 4.57 17.18
2.92 12.21
4 Routine manual 16.29
15.75***
Panel 3: by ethno-hukou
1 Salariat 1.74 4.92 2.91 16.51
3.86 7.04 4.60 26.25
2.19 2.09** 3.33 7.20**
0.84 4.73 5.27 3.28***
2 Clerical 3.47 1.88 45.14
7.38 1.30 36.28
2.38 2.48 7.84**
0.77 0.70 2.75**
3 Own account 4.26 14.22
6.43 —
2.79 5.55
5.63 7.47
4 Routine manual 14.22
—
5.55***
7.47
Notes: The odds ratios in each cell are for Han and minority in Panel 1; for urban and rural hukou origins in Panel 2, and for Han urban,
minority urban, Han rural, andminority rural in Panel 3, respectively; For cell counts below 5, the odds ratios are not shown (as indicated
by -); Significance tests are conducted with Han in Panel 1, urban in Panel 2 and Han urban in Panel 3 as reference groups. * p < 0.05;
** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001.
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There are, as expected, pronounced hukou effects on
mobility chances, particularly surrounding Class 5 (agri-
cultural workers). Thus, as we see in Panel 2, men of ur-
ban hukou origins tend to havemore favourable chances,
at three times or higher, than do men of rural origins
in the class competitions, namely, in competing to avoid
agricultural positions. For instance, in the Classes 1 ver-
sus 5 competitions, the odds ratios are 18.3 and 6.4 for
urban and rural sectors respectively, and 16.3 and 5.8 for
the routinemanual versus peasant sons, both pairs being
significantly different at the 0.001 levels.
There are thus both ethnic and hukou differences
which are most concentrated in the class competition in
trying to arrive at higher, and to avoid agricultural, jobs.
The combined effects, as shown in Panel 3, bring the dis-
advantages of minority rural men to the sharpest relief.
It is true that among these men, coming from salariat
families still have an advantage of around 3.3 times being
themselves found in salariat rather than peasant jobs as
compared with their peasant peers in the same kind of
competition, but this is less than half than for their Han
peers (7.2), and well below that for the urban co-ethnics
(26.3) or for the urban Han (16.5). Further analysis, using
minority rural men as the reference group, shows that all
three groups are significantlymore advantaged (p. 0.001,
0.016 and 0.009 respectively).
We have, in the preceding analysis, looked at the
absolute and the relative mobility rates associated with
ethnicity and hukou origins. Family class, ethnicity and
hukou statuses are shown as being very important mark-
ers of social inequality in China. There are, however,
other factors which we could not consider due to con-
straints in descriptive and loglinear modelling. For in-
stance, minorities tend to reside in underdeveloped ar-
eas and face more structural barriers. In our data, only
22%ofminoritymen as against 35%of theHan have high-
school education or above. The former are also less likely
than the latter to be CCP members (12% and 15% re-
spectively). In the remaining part of this section, we turn
to logit analysis on access to professional-managerial
salariat to try to control for these and other factors. We
construct five models. Model 1 includes father’s class
and respondent’s own age; model 2 adds father’s educa-
tion and CCPmembership as well as respondent’s ethno-
hukou status (we use rural Han as the reference group
for modelling stability as this is the largest group in our
data); models 3 and 4 add respondent’s education and
CCP membership respectively (as indicators of cultural
and political capital); and model 5 further adds an inter-
action term for ethno-hukou and education (level of ed-
ucation is used as a continuous variable here following Li
& O’Leary, 2007).
With regard to data in Table 4, we find, in model 1,
strong effects of father’s class, and with clear gradients.
Even with age differences taken into account, coming
from salariat families is highly conducive to one’s ca-
reer life, increasing the odds of salariat access by around
five-fold (e1.604 = 4.97). When father’s education, CCP
membership and respondent’s ethno-hukou status are
entered in Model 2, we find that these have highly sig-
nificant effects and that the effect of father’s class, al-
beit reduced, is still highly significant. InModel 3, respon-
dent’s own education is taken into considerationwhich is
shown as being of chief importance in explaining salariat
access while the effects of father’s education and CCP
membership as well as respondent’s own ethno-hukou
status are reduced to a general insignificance, suggest-
ing that these effects are mediated via respondents’ ed-
ucation. Surprisingly, we see that father’s class is still
highly significant. In Model 4, we further control for re-
spondent’s own CCP membership which is found to be
highly conducive to salariat access (in our data, 37% of
the salariat, 23% of the clerical workers but only 8% of
the agricultural workers are CCP members: joining the
CCP is usually a first step in one’s career advancement in
China). Finally, in Model 5, we control for the interaction
effects of ethno-hukou status and education. The pattern
of the coefficients for the other variables in the model
are little changed as compared with those in Model 4
but we do find that the returns to themajority men of ur-
ban hukou status are negative, echoingWuand Treiman’s
(2007) finding that given the institutional divide, only the
‘best and brightest’ from rural origins could gain their
passport to urban life via higher education and those
who do manage to do so tend to occupy the elite posi-
tions. Also noticeable is the fact that the coefficients for
the minority rural men remain strongly negative and per-
sistently significant from Models 2 to 5.
Finally, we present a bird’s eye view of mobility
chances conditional on father’s class and ethno-hukou
status (Figure 2). The data are obtained from the pre-
dicted probabilities based on Model 5 of Table 4, with
the effects of the covariates taken at their mean val-
ues. Hence the data pertain to the net effects of fa-
ther’s class and ethno-hukou statuses. The stratification
order is clearly shown. Other things being equal, a minor-
ity man of rural hukou origin would still have a smaller
chance of becoming a professional or manager than his
Han compatriot with urban hukou even if the former
comes from a salariat family and the latter from agricul-
tural origin (typically working on state farms): 21.5% ver-
sus 22.6%. And the disparity runs seven times as high be-
tween urban Hanmen from salariat families and rural mi-
nority men from peasant families in the competition for
salariat destinations (44.9% and 6.6%).
5. Discussion and Conclusion
We have, in this paper, made what we believe as the first
attempt to study intergenerational social mobility by eth-
nicity in contemporary China. Drawing on the best avail-
able data containing the key variables for the analysis (fa-
ther’s and own class, ethno-hukou statuses and a range
of other factors), we conducted the analysis of both ab-
solute and relative rates of mobility for men from minor-
ity and majority ethnic groups and of rural and urban
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Table 4. Logit regression results on access to the professional-managerial salariat.
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
Father’s class (peasant = ref)
Salariat −1.604*** −0.889*** −0.793*** −0.790*** −0.728***
Clerical −1.247*** −0.666*** −0.458*** −0.469*** −0.431***
Own account −1.032*** −0.666*** −0.457*** −0.474*** −0.384**
Routine manual −0.823*** −0.376*** −0.256*** −0.268*** −0.213**
Age −0.007 −0.011 −0.046*** −0.041*** −0.042***
Log age −0.020 −0.391 −0.624 −0.787 −0.812
Father’s education (primary = ref)
Higher professional+ −0.931*** −0.178 −0.130 −0.011
Lower professional −0.807*** −0.107 −0.067 −0.007
Higher secondary −0.594*** −0.038 −0.021 −0.015
Lower secondary −0.498*** −0.174** −0.183** −0.191**
Father’s CCP membership −0.192*** −0.026 −0.121 −0.107
Ethno-hukou (Han rural = ref)
Han urban −0.507*** −0.026 −0.034 −0.957***
Minority urban −0.193 −0.026 −0.079 −0.108
Minority rural −0.473*** −0.234* −0.234* −0.478*
R’s education (lower sec = ref)
Degree+ −4.130*** −3.759*** −4.205***
Higher professional −3.341*** −3.043*** −3.326***
Lower professional −2.326*** −2.152*** −2.282***
Higher secondary −1.439*** −1.314*** −1.320***
R’s CCP membership −0.900*** −0.887***
Ethno-hukou*education (Han rural = ref)
Han urban −0.329***
Minority urban −0.030
Minority rural −0.116
Constant −2.007* −3.297** −2.281 −1.600 −1.611
Pseudo R2 −0.073 −0.094 −0.296 −0.309 −0.314
N 34712 33014 32990 32753 32753
Note: The coefficients for years (1996 = ref) are not shown. We also checked using the list-wise approach (using the same data as
available in all models) and found the same patterns (data from the list-wise approach and those on years are available on request).
* p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001.
Figure 2. Predicted probability of access to the salariat.
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hukou statuses. Our main findings can be summarised
as follows.
In terms of gross mobility, we found that minority
and majority men from the urban sector were not much
different from each other but those from rural origins
had greater mobility, especially those from the majority
group who had the greatest net class advancement. This
is most likely due to themassive internal migration in the
reform period where an estimated 260 million people of
rural status went to cities to find jobs in the burgeoning
and rapidly developing industries and commercial enter-
prises. Ruralmen ofminority backgrounds alsomade use
of the opportunities but to a lesser extent. Coming from
a much lower starting point, ethnic minority men from
rural origins not only had lower total mobility, but their
upward mobility rates were also the lowest as compared
with the other groups. They had fewer family resources
to start with and even those from similar backgrounds
were less able to inherit their family resources, as shown
in the ‘symmetrical odds ratios’, resulting in the signifi-
cantly weaker association between origins and destina-
tions. Even with parental and own cultural and political
capital taken into account, we still found that ethnic mi-
nority men from rural origins were significantly behind
other groups in access to the salariat. The net mobility
profiles, as we saw in Figure 2 on predicted probabilities,
show a clear stratification order in China with threemain
features. Firstly, family class has a very important influ-
ence for all ethno-hukou groups but more so for the ma-
jority men from urban origins than for others. Secondly,
those of minority rural statuses faced the gravest disad-
vantages, much more so than their majority peers from
similar (rural) origins. Thirdly, ethnicity is also shown to
have some influence for the urban sector but the effects
are generally weaker than for the rural sector.
How do we explain the findings? A great deal has
been written about the household registration (hukou)
system in creating the barriers against the rural citizens
in upward social mobility (Bian, 2008; Chen, 2013; Li et
al., 2015; Lin & Bian, 1991; Wu & Treiman, 2007) and
the disadvantages faced by rural citizens are expected.
We have also seen above that a whole range of prefer-
ential policies, especially in the last thirty years or so,
have been adopted by governments at all levels to cre-
ate more favourable opportunities for the ethnic minori-
ties, and such policies cover a host of areas from educa-
tion, employment to economic development. Given such
favourable opportunities, why do ethnic minority men
from rural origins still lag behind?
There are of course many reasons accounting for our
findings the most important of which would be the long-
standing poverty due to the relative underdevelopment
of the local economy in the minority regions, especially
in rural areas. The government assistance, in the forms of
preferential policies, direct funding and investment, has
no doubt helped the minority populations to ameliorate
the situation.Without such generous support, the ethnic
gaps in mobility would have been much larger. Yet some
of the policies, well-intended as they were in respecting
and preserving minority cultures such as the exemption
from the family-planning policies, might have had the
unintended consequences of perpetuating their poverty.
For rural ethnic families already struggling in poverty and
with rather limited upward mobility chances available
in the local economy, having three, four or more chil-
dren would only reduce their chances for improvement
as comparedwith urban familieswith smaller family sizes
or even with the majority peers in the rural, more devel-
oped, area where the family-planning policies were gen-
erally reinforced.
The bilingual education adopted for some ethnic
schools may also have had the unintended consequences
of adding to the learning difficulties of ethnic children,
making it harder for them to compete with Mandarin
speakers (Lin, 1997;Ma, 2007). Thismight not be a serious
problem in the developed areas with high quality of ed-
ucation, such as areas where ethnic Koreans are located,
but it may have aggravated the educational disadvantage
formost of the other ethnicminority groups. Furthermore,
the lowermarks required of ethnic students for college ad-
missions, whilst a clear boost to ethnic equality, may also
have lowered their competitive edge as compared with
that of the majority students studying in national universi-
ties. In an increasingly market-oriented economy, demon-
strated competence, rather than a formal diploma or cer-
tificate, is becoming the order of the day in China.
There aremany other reasonswhichwe cannot cover
here. Overall, we would say that ethnic minorities may
have enjoyed equal or better opportunities (as entailed
in the preferential policies) relative to themajority group
but it is the inequality of condition that sets the two
groups apart. Thus, the government should do more,
rather than less, to help the minorities, especially those
in the rural, poverty-stricken, regions.
Finally, we need to draw the readers’ caution that,
even thoughwehaveusedwhat are the best data sources
currently available for ethnic mobility analysis, there are
limitations in our study. Firstly, due to the lack of data
between 1996 and 2005, we could not explore mobility
trajectories in the intervening years. On the other hand,
given the pattern as shown in Footnote Figure 1, there
is little reason to believe that the mobility trajectories in
those years would have diverged greatly from what is re-
vealed in the analysis had data for the years been avail-
able. Changes in the mechanisms of social reproduction
usually take place at a rather slow pace, as the volumi-
nous mobility research in the world over half a century
has shown. Secondly, although our pooled data cover all
31 provinces, autonomous regions and municipalities, Ti-
bet, Qinghai and Ningxia were underrepresented as they
were not covered in the earlier years. Thus, the minority
groups in those areaswere less represented than in other
areas. While this is less than desirable, we need to bear
in mind that the minority groups in these provinces are
mainly Zang andHui ethnicminorities who are also found
in large numbers in other provinces and cities such as
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Sichuan, Chongqing, Shaanxi, Gansu, Henan and Shanxi
which were well represented in the data used in the anal-
ysis, and this would give us fairly good reasons to believe
that the mobility chances of their co-ethnics who were
surveyed in the other provinces will have been generally
representative of their own trajectories. This having been
said, the lower growth rates of the local economies in
the three provinces in the last few decades might have
had negative effects on the upward mobility chances of
the ethnic minorities, resulting in an underestimation of
the ethnic gaps in the provinces concerned. This needs
to be further examined in future studies if and when ap-
propriate data become available. Thirdly, as the minority
groups constitute only a very small proportion in the over-
all population, we have not been able to make further
differentiations amongst the ethnic groups in the present
study. Fourthly and for similar reasons, we have not been
able to examine the spatial effects on ethnic stratifica-
tion. Our findings of overall similarity between theminor-
ity and the majority groups among the urban sector sug-
gest, as Gustafsson and Li (2003) and Gustafsson and Sai
(2009) showed in their poverty studies, that there might
be strong spatial effects. Maybe ethnic mobility chances
are similar in the more developed, coastal, provinces.
Overall, while this is the first systematic study of social
mobility by ethnic groups in contemporary China based
on the best data currently available, there aremany other
domains of social mobility that we have not been able to
explore. Our analysis has also opened up some new chan-
nels of exploration which future analyses could under-
take, with more and better-quality sample surveys that
are being collected in China.
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